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RECENT DECISIONS
Linnell: State v. Paskvan

CRIMINAL LAW-SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR TO MINORS--EFFECT OF
SELLER'S MISTAKE OF AMINOR'S AGE--On July 9, 1955, Barry Neu, age

fifteen years, entered a tavern owned and operated by defendant and
asked to purchase a case of beer. Defendant inquired as to Neu's age
and Neu stated that he was twenty-one, but the owner required proof.
The minor then left the bar and later returned with a card containing
false names and addresses but no mention of age. After examining
the card, defendant sold the ease of beer to Neu. The minor was
later discovered with the beer in his car, the liquor was confiscated, and a
criminal proceeding was instituted against the defendant for violation of
the statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to minor persons.1 The district
court found defendant guilty of a misdemeanor. The defendant claimed
error in the refusal of the court to give an instruction which made the sale
of liquor to a minor prima facie evidence of a violation of the statute and
would allow the defendant to rebut the presumption by a showing of reasonable care in the sale. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. The sale of liquor to a minor is unlawful; the minor's representations and the seller's belief of full age are immaterial in determining
whether the statute has been violated. State v. Paskvan, 309 P.2d 1019
(Mont. 1957).
The respective states through their legislatures are invested with broad
police powers. The court's function in examining the constitutional aspect
of police legislation is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a
legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accom.
plish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way. If the enactment meets
this test, it satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process and
equal protection of the laws.! The right of state legislatures, in the exercise of their police power, to regulate the sale and distribution of liquor
is thoroughly established.'
Whether a legislature may exclude the element of intent from a statutory offense will depend on whether the act is malum prohibitum or malum
in se. The phrase malum in se means that an act is wrong in itself and
illegal from the very nature of the transaction.! An offense malum prohibitum, on the other hand, is not naturally evil, but becomes so in consequence of its being forbidden by statute.' If an offense is denominated
malum prohibitum the legislature may, in the interest of the public welfare,
exclude the element of intent or knowledge and make the liability of an
accused depend solely upon performance of the prohibited act.'
The rule in a majority of states having liquor statutes similiar to that
of Montana is that an honest mistake as to the buyer's age by the seller of
intoxicating beverages is no defense to a prosecution for violation of that
1

RrvisED CoDES OF

MINTANA, 1947, § 94-35-106: "Any person who shall sell, give
away, or dispose of intoxicating liquors to any person under the age of twenty-one
(21) years, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
2
Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d 606 (1957).
'Stephen v. Great Falls, 119 Mont. 368, 175 P.2d 408 (1946).
'State v. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. 516, 520, 118 P.2d 280, 286 (1941) (dictum).
*People v. Boxer, 24 N.Y.S.2d 628, 632 (N.Y. Ct. of Spec. Sess., Bronx Div. 1940)
(dictum).
OState v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 Pac. 107 (1920).
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statute.' These courts hold that it is clearly the purpose of the legislature
to absolutely prohibit the sale of liquor to minors, regardless of the intent
or knowledge with which the sale was made.'
The courts are not completely in accord on the matter, however. Courts
of a small minority of states with statutes absolutely prohibiting the sale
of liquor to minors imply the element of intent in interpreting the statute.
They hold that intent is a necessary element in a criminal prosecution and
in the absence of express words the legislature would not be considered to
have intended such injustice as punishing as criminal an act which involved
no intent.! In these jurisdictions the sale of liquor to a minor is regarded
as prima facie evidence of violation of the statute, but if the seller can show
that he had good reason to believe, and did believe, that the buyer was
twenty-one, there is no liability.' The burden is upon the defendant to
show as an affirmative defense his lack of knowledge.of the buyer's minority. ,'
The effect of such a rule is to remove from the liquor vendor the heavy
burden of absolute liability despite diligent inquiry that is imposed under
the majority rule. However, at the same time it creates the uncertainty
in the enforcement of the law which is the usual result of employing a subjective standard in the determination of liability.
In many states liquor statutes incorporate the words, "knowingly"
or "wilfully."'
Here, the element of intent is specifically made a part of
the offense, and the statute is not left open to judicial interpretation. If,
then, the seller of intoxicants can show that he acted prudently in a sale
to a minor, the sale will not have been made "wilfully" within the meaning of the statute.' As under the minority rule, when a statute similiar to
Montana's is construed, the seller must take all the proper precautions in
ascertaining the age of the minor, and must form an honest belief therefrom before he may escape prosecution under the statute.
The Montana legislature has taken steps to ease the burden of inquiry
on the liquor seller by recently enacting a statute which authorizes the issuance of a state identification card to a person twenty-one, and makes the
card prima facie evidence of the holder's majority.1' It does not appear,
however, that the strict liability imposed under the rule of the principal
case is alleviated. This is because the statute nowhere mentions the liability
'See 30 AM. JUR., Intowicating Liquor8 § 328 (1939), for discussion and citation of
authority.
8
Hershorne v. People, 108 Colo. 43, 113 P.2d 680 (1941) ; State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa
599, 57 N.W.2d 553 (1953).
9
State v. Fahey, 21 Del. 585, 65 Atl. 260 (1904) ; People v. Bronner, 145 Mich. 39,
108 N.W. 672 (1906).
"°State v. Fahey, 8upra note 9.
"People v. Bronner, 145 Mich. 39, 108 N.W. 672 (1906).
"State v. McCormick, 56 Wash. 469, 105 Pac. 1037 (1909).

'aState v. McCormick, supra note 12.
1

vRwisE CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 4-506: "All persons attaining the age of twentyone (21) years may apply to the county clerk and recorder ... for an identification
card which shall prima facie establish that the applicant has reached the age of
twenty-one (21) years." For analysis, see Montana Legislative Summary, 1957,
18 MONTANA L. REv. 122, 123 (1957).
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of a liquor seller after relying upon one of the authorized identification
cards in a sale to a minor.
It is submitted that the protection of adolescents against psychic and
physical impairment from the use of alchohol, being a settled policy of the
state, is more important than the inconvenience that might come to the
liquor purveyors in taking the trouble to ascertain the maturity of their
customers. The burden is not intolerable, and the legislature has the undoubted power to impose it. If it seems too heavy, relaxation should come
from the legislature and not from the courts.
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TENANCIES-

JOINT

In 1944 Marion E. Hennigh and her husband, Charles D. Hennigh,
purchased certain real property by warranty deed with money from a joint
bank account. The deed described the grantees as "Charles D. Hennigh
and Marion E. Hennigh as Joint Tenants of Townsend, Montana." In the
granting, habendum and warranty clauses was typed the word "their,"
so that the clause read "their heirs and assigns." Mr. Hennigh died intestate in 1948 and his wife claimed the above property by right of survivorship. It was therefore omitted from an inventory and appraisal of the
decedent's estate. The petitioners, children of the deceased husband by a
former marriage, made an application in the probate court to include said
property in the decedent's estate. This application being denied, the petitioners brought an action in the district court which was also dismissed. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, held, affirmed. By the use of
the words "joint tenants" in the warranty deed a joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship was created. Hennigh v. Hennigh, 309 P.2d 1022
(Mont. 1957).
Joint tenancy is the form of co-ownership in which each co-owner is
possessed of the whole of the estate, subject to the other's interest. In contrast is the other form of co-ownership, tenancy in common, where tenants
hold distinct, although undivided, interests. The chief difference between
the two is that the former carries with it the right of survivorship while
the latter does not.
The very early common law concerning joint tenancies seems to be
uncertain.' But at quite an early period judges tended to favor the joint
tenancy, so that a conveyance to two or more people without a contrary intent shown was regarded as creating a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy
in common.' This favoritism developed because it tended to lesson feudal
burdens since only one service was due from all joint tenants. With the
abolition of tenures this reason no longer existed, and the courts began to
look with disfavor on the joint tenancy because it worked a hardship on
the heirs and made no provision for posterity.' Thus courts began to take
'See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 421 n. 23 (3d. ed. 1939).

'See Sturkis v. Sturkis, 316 Ill. 114, 146 N.E. 530, 531 (1925) (dictum) ; Svenson v.
Hanson, 289 Il1. 242, 124 N.E. 645, 647 (1919) (dictum) ; Wolfe v. Wolfe, 207 Miss.
480, 42 So. 2d 438, 438 (1949) (dictum).
'See Shipley v. Shipley, 324 Ill. 560, 155 N.E. 334, 335 (1927) (dictum).
'See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPRTY § 421 at 202 (3d ed. 1939).
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